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LIQUIDATED DAMAGES UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
by
Roy Ryden Anderson*

I.

INTRODUCTION

A.

Scope Note

liquidated damage clause, quite simply, attempts to stipulate or
make certain the amount of damages that will be recoverable in the
event of breach. Parties should use a liquidated damage clause in
drafting a contract whenever it appears, looking forward, that a breach
might cause damage that will be speculative in amount or otherwise difficult
to prove. When the damages from a breach will likely be speculative in
amount, a properly drafted liquidated damage clause will avoid or reduce
the expense and difficulty of proving damages and will make certain that the
aggrieved party is not left without remedy. A liquidated damage clause, as
its title suggests, will also liquidate damages at the time of breach so that
prejudgment interest will begin to run immediately against the breaching
party.' A.liquidated damage provision may function, as a practical matter,
to deter breach in situations where one party might otherwise feel comfortable in breaching because of a perceived inability of the other to prove
damages.
Although the Code permits the parties to liquidate damages, that permission cannot be exercised so as to violate the overriding principle of compensation. Historically, this principle prohibits the parties from providing in the
contract for the imposition of a penalty penal damages upon breach. 2 Properly construed, a valid liquidated damage provision, as opposed to a penalty
clause, does not allocate risk except to the extent that the provision imposes
on the party to be charged the obligation to pay uncertain damages. Despite
the broad freedom of contract principles embodied in the Code, 3 section 1106 forbids that "penal damages may be had except as specifically provided
© Copyright reserved by Roy Ryden Anderson and Callaghan and Company. This Article is a
draft of a chapter of a book on damages under the Uniform Commercial Code, authored by
Professor Anderson and to be published by Callaghan and Company.
* B.A., Texas Christian University; J.D., Southern Methodist University; LL.M., Yale
University. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. See Dunbar, Drafting the Liquidated Damage Clause- When and How, 20 OHIO ST.
L.J. 221, 231-32 (1959), for a listing of various advantages of liquidated damage clauses.
2. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF THE DAMAGES § 146 (1935).
3. See generally Sweet, Liquidated Damages in California,60 CALIF. L. REV. 84 (1972)
(discusses policy considerations and trends in party autonomy). Section 1-102(3) provides:
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in this Act or by other rule of law." '4
Liquidated damage clauses are readily distinguishable in the abstract from
penalty clauses. A penalty clause functions to coerce performance rather
than to estimate damages. Liquidated damage provisions under the Code
structure must also be distinguished from clauses limiting or excluding remedies and damages. Section 2-718(1) governs the former and section 2-719
governs the latter. A remedy limitation provision, quite clearly, acts as a
risk allocator because it restricts the liability of the breaching party. A liquidated damage provision, on the other hand, does not attempt to restrict liability, but merely attempts to estimate the damages that are or will likely be
caused by a breach.5 Nevertheless, many Code cases have confusingly referred to section 2-718 on liquidated damages when discussing a remedy limitation provision that section 2-719 would properly govern. 6 The cause of
this confusion in analysis no doubt centers around the fact that section 2-719
expressly subjects itself to the provisions on liquidated damage clauses in
section 2-718. 7 Further, as a practical matter, a liquidated damage provision
is a type of exclusive, limited remedy. 8 When a liquidated damage provision
is properly applicable, the aggrieved party is relegated to it for his remedy
and may not pursue other remedies under the Code. 9 The occasional confusion by the courts in referring to section 2-718 when analyzing general remedy limitation provisions has not to date affected the correctness of the
courts' results. Ultimately, the efficacy of the provision turns on the stanThe effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as
otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good faith,
diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed
by agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by

which the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards
are not manifestly unreasonable.
U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1978).
4. U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1978).
5. See Tharalson v. Pfizer Genetics, Inc., 728 F.2d 1108, 1112, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 153, 157-58 (8th Cir. 1984) (reasonableness test of § 2-718(1) does not apply to
limitation of damages provision, which § 2-719 governs).
6. See Lafayette Stabilizer Repair, Inc. v. Machinery Wholesalers Corp., 750 F.2d 1290,
40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 122 (5th Cir. 1985); Kohlenberger, Inc. v. Tyson's Foods,
Inc., 256 Ark. 584, 510 S.W.2d 555, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1281 (1974); Dessert
Seed Co. v. Drew Farmers Supply, Inc., 240 Ark. 858, 454 S.W.2d 307, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 995 (1970); Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. Vnergy Coop., Inc., 122 Ill. App. 3d 940,
461 N.E.2d 1049, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1222 (1984); McCarty v. E.J. Korvette,
Inc., 28 Md. App. 421, 347 A.2d 253, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 14 (1975); Latimer v.
William Mueller & Son, Inc., 149 Mich. App. 620, 386 N.W.2d 618, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 1128 (1986); Billings v. Joseph Harris Co., 290 N.C. 502, 226 S.E.2d 321, 19
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callagian) 1326 (1976); Simpson v. Phone Directories Co., 82 Or. App.
582, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1321 (1986). Contra Tharalson v. Pfizer Genetics,
Inc., 728 F.2d 1108, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 153, 157-58 (8th Cir. 1984) (remedy
limitation provisions governed by § 2-719, not § 2-718).

7. Section 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code begins with the following: "Subject
to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and of the preceding section on
liquidation and limitation of damages ..
" U.C.C. § 2-719(1) (1978).
8. See Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n v. Nelson, 223 N.W.2d 494, 17 U.C.C.

Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 139 (N.D. 1974).
9. See 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1061 (1964) [hereinafter CORBIN].
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dards provided by section 2-719.10
Historically, the courts have had great difficulty providing and applying
sensible standards for determining the validity of liquidated damage provisions. As will be seen, section 2-718 is likely to do little to abate this
confusion.
B.

The Statute

Section 2-718(1) of the Commercial Code provides:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement
but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated
or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and
the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate
remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as
a penalty.II
C. HistoricalBackground
The genesis of standards against which to judge the efficacy of liquidated
damage provisions is the early English reaction, first in equity and then at
law, against the enforcement of penal bonds in cases in which no actual damages were suffered. 12 Over time this negative reaction spread to all types of
clauses that provided for penalties upon breach of contract. In this country,
a rule evolved that contractual provisions stipulating the amount of recovery
upon breach would be allowed only when the parties reasonably attempted
to pre-estimate damages that might result from the breach. Although the
courts made it clear they would not disregard the general principles of freedom of contract nor overlook the importance of the intent of the parties, the
rule was firmly established that courts would enforce a liquidated damage
provision only when it represented a fair estimate of the harm likely to result
13
from the breach.
In the 1930s, the Restatement of Contracts suggested the following rule
structure:
An agreement, made in advance of breach, fixing the damages therefor is not enforceable as a contract and does not affect the damages
recoverable for the breach, unless
10. See Lafayette Stabilizer Repair, Inc. v. Machinery Wholesalers Corp., 750 F.2d 1290,

40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 122 (5th Cir. 1985); Kohlenberger, Inc. v. Tyson's Foods,
Inc., 256 Ark. 584, 510 S.W.2d 555, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1281 (1974); Dessert
Seed Co. v. Drew Farmers Supply, Inc., 240 Ark. 858, 454 S.W.2d 307, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 995 (1970); Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. Energy Coop., Inc., 122 I11App. 3d 940,
461 N.E.2d 1049, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1222 (1984); McCarty v. E.J. Korvette,
Inc., 28 Md. App. 421, 347 A.2d 253, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 14 (1975); Latimer v.

William Mueller & Son, Inc., 149 Mich. App. 620, 386 N.W.2d 618, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 1128 (1986); Billings v. Joseph Harris Co., 290 N.C. 502, 226 S.E.2d 321, 19
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1326 (1976); Simpson v. Phone Directories Co., 82 Or. App. 582, 2 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1321 (1986).

11. U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1978).
12. See 5 CORaIN, supra note 9, § 1056.
13. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105 (1907).
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(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of just compensation
for the harm that is caused by the breach, and
(b) the harm that is caused by the4 breach is one that is incapable or
very difficult of accurate estimation.1
The Restatement provision came to be widely followed by the courts in virtually every jurisdiction. The majority of the courts interpreted the provision to focus on the time of the making of the contract.1 5 The twofold test of
the courts was: (1) whether, at the time of contracting, it appeared that the
damages likely to result from breach would be uncertain in amount; and (2)
whether the parties made a reasonable forecast of the amount of harm likely
to be caused by the breach.16 Under this rule structure, the actual damages
suffered were regarded as irrelevant, the focus being entirely upon the time
of the contracting.17 The courts often said that the bright-line test was the
intent of the parties.18 If the parties intended to make a good faith preestimate of uncertain damages, courts would enforce the clause.' 9 If the
parties intended to provide for a penalty, courts would invalidate the
clause. 20 Professor Corbin was quick to point out that this reasoning was
wholly circular. 21 In the context of liquidated damage provisions, "intent of
the parties" provided nothing more than a means for squaring doctrine with
result. 22 Regardless of the language used by the parties in the contract, if the
courts determined that the parties had made a legitimate pre-estimate of uncertain damages, they enforced the provision. 23 If the courts determined
otherwise, they did not. 24 The test, then, was truly twofold and the actual
intent of the parties was irrelevant.
Under the reasonable forecast or pre-estimate test, many courts held that
actual damages were irrelevant. 25 Even in cases in which no actual damages
were suffered or in which the liquidated damage provision was grossly disproportionate to actual damages, the agreed clause was enforced. 26 Under
this view, courts would not admit evidence of actual damages into the trial
14. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339(1) (1932).
15. See United States v. J.D. Streett & Co., 151 F. Supp. 469 (E.D. Mo. 1957); Byron
Jackson Co. v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Cal. 1940); Norwalk Door Closer Co. v.
Eagle Lock & Screw Co., 153 Conn. 681, 220 A.2d 263 (1966); see 5 CORBIN, supra note 9,

§§ 1059, 1060 for a collection of these cases.
16. See supra note 15.

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Dunbar, supra note 1,at 221.
22. See id. at 225; see also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339 comment b (1932).
"[N]either the intention of the parties nor their expression of intention is the governing consideration. The payment promised may be a penalty, though described expressly as liquidated
damages, and vice versa." Id.
23. See 5 CORBIN, supra note 9, § 1059.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Frick Co. v. Rubel Corp., 62 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1933); Stephens v. Essex Co.
Park Comm'r., 143 F. 844 (3d Cir. 1906); Wood v. Niagara Falls Paper Co., 121 F. 818 (2d
Cir. 1903).
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record. 27 Over time, most courts came to reject this view and allowed evidence to show that no actual damages were suffered or that the liquidated
damage provision provided for damages grossly in excess of those actually
suffered. 28 In this sense, at least, the basic principle of compensation was
honored. Professor Corbin stated the theory as follows:
The probable injury that the parties had reason to foresee is a fact
that largely determines the question whether they made a genuine preestimate of that injury; but the justice and equity of enforcement depend
also upon the amount of injury that has occurred. It is to be observed
that hindsight is frequently better than foresight, and that, in passing
judgment upon the honesty and genuineness of the pre-estimate made
by the parties, the court
cannot help but be influenced by its knowledge
29
of subsequent events.
Nevertheless, if the court concluded that the clause provided a reasonable
pre-estimate of uncertain damages and that enforcement of the agreement
would not be unconscionable, the court would enforce the liquidated damage
clause even though actual damages were certain in amount and could be
readily proved.
The irony of this rule structure is that it is premised on Restatement of
Contracts section 339. The Restatement provision, read quite literally,
would seem to focus much more on the actual damages suffered than on the
pre-estimate of the parties. The parties must make a reasonable forecast of
the injury that "is caused by the breach" and the injury must be "one that is
incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation." '30 Accordingly, courts are
required to enforce a liquidated damage provision only in cases in which
actual damages do in fact turn out to be uncertain and difficult to prove. If
actual damages are readily determinable, the liquidated damages provision
should not be enforced. The commentary to section 339 emphatically supports this reasoning. The following unequivocal statement is made:
If the parties honestly but mistakenly suppose that a breach will
cause harm that will be incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation, when in fact the breach causes no harm at all or none that is incapable of accurate estimation without difficulty, their advance agreement
fixing the amount to be paid as damages for the breach is within the rule
stated in subsection (1) and is not enforceable. Evidence to prove such
a mistake is admissible. But if the breach has caused injury of such a
character that it is incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation, an
advance agreement making a reasonable forecast of its amount is enforced; and evidence, the purpose of which is to substitute an estimate
by the court or jury for that made by the parties, is irrelevant. 3'
27. Frick Co., 62 F.2d at 767-68; Stephens, 143 F. at 844; Wood, 121 F. at 818.
28. See, e.g., Woodmen v. Sankin, 188 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1960), aff'd, 289 F.2d 873
(D.C. Cir. 1961); Norwalk Door Closer Co. v. Eagle Lock & Screw Co., 153 Conn. 681, 220
A.2d 263 (1966); see 5 CORBIN, supra note 9, § 1063, at 363-64 n.58 for a collection of these
cases.
29. 5 CORBIN supra note 9, § 1063, at 362-64.
30. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339 (1932).
31. Id. § 339 comment e; see also id. § 339, comment c, which states:
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Although followed by only a minority of jurisdictions, 32 the above analysis is
more sensible. 33 It fully supports the basic principle of contract law that the
aggrieved party should be fully compensated and provides the best rule to
ensure that penal clauses are not enforced. The courts should enforce a provision for liquidated damages only when the parties at the time of contracting presume that the damages at breach will be uncertain in amount and
that presumption actually proves to be an accurate forecast of future events.
Parties should always obtain actual damages when they can be proved
with reasonable certainty. It is difficult to understand the relish with which
our courts have historically taken to focusing, except in extreme cases, entirely on the time of contracting. A desire to carry forward the intent of the
parties is often expressed, along with a reluctance to undermine the utility of
liquidated damage provisions by subjecting them to proof of actual damages
in every case. 34 But the intention of the parties, even under the majority
rule, must have been based on a reasonable presumption that actual damages
would be difficult to prove. If the court can ascertain the actual damages
with reasonable certainty, then the parties were mistaken in their assumption, and the court should not enforce the agreed damages. A rule structure
that limits the enforcement of liquidated damage provisions to situations involving uncertain damages not only carries forward the required intention of
the parties, but also preserves the basic rule of contract damage law that a
court should place an injured party in the position it would have occupied
had the contract been performed.
D. Applicability in Contractsfor the Sale of Goods
Regardless of whether courts have focused upon the situation at the time
of contracting or upon the actual damages incurred, courts have restricted
liquidated damage provisions to situations involving uncertain damages.
Either the damages likely to be caused must be difficult to prove or those
actually caused must be "incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation. '' 35 The Code carries forward this tradition by permitting liquidated
damages only as "is reasonable in the light of ... the difficulties of proof of
loss. '' 36 For this reason, liquidated damage provisions are not commonly
Where the amount of loss or harm that has been caused by a breach is uncertain and difficult of estimation in money, experience has shown that the estimate
of a court or jury is no more likely to be exact compensation than is the advance
estimate of the parties themselves. Further, the enforcement of such agreements
saves the time of courts, juries, parties, and witnesses and reduces the expense of
litigation. In such cases, if it is not shown that the principle of compensation
had been disregarded, the liquidation by the parties is made effective.
Id. The illustrations to § 339 appear, however, to contradict each other regarding the relevancy of actual damages. Compare id. § 339, illustration 2 with id. § 339, illustrations 3, 7.
32. See Stewart v. Basey, 245 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. 1952).
33. See Sweet, supra note 3, at 131-32.
34. See generally Note, Liquidated Damages Recovery Under the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 862, 867-71 (1982) (discusses courts analysis of issue under
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339 (1932)).
35. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339(l)(b) (1932).

36. U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1978).
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enforced in contracts for the sale of goods. Most goods sold have a readily
ascertainable, established market against which to calculate damages,
whether for the seller or the buyer. 37 Accordingly, in most sale of goods
cases it will be unlikely at the time of contracting that a breach will cause an
injury too difficult to prove. Nor in fact will the actual injury produce uncertain damages. In one Code case, for example, the buyer breached a contract to purchase a Rolls-Royce automobile.3 8 The contract provided that
the seller could retain the buyer's $5,000 deposit as liquidated damages upon
the buyer's refusal to take delivery. The court refused to enforce the provision under section 2-718 .39 The court said:
We reject the application of the liquidated damage clause in the present
case, as the trial judge did below because it is clear that the actual damages are capable of accurate estimation. We do not say this from hindsight made possible because the actual figures claimed were in evidence.
We say it because at the time the contract was made, it was clear that
the nature of any damages which would result from a possible future
breach was such that they would be easily ascertainable.A0
Although an occasional Code case has enforced a provision for liquidated
41
damages in a situation involving only general damages for standard goods,
courts will usually restrict the enforcement of liquidated damage provisions
to cases involving unique or specially manufactured goods, 4 2 those having no
established market, to situations involving delivery delays,43 and to situations involving special damages. 44 The latter two catagories of cases will
usually involve buyers as plaintiffs, and the clause will apply either to a
seller's delay in delivery or to a buyer's special damages. Sellers rarely suffer
special damages that are difficult to prove. A seller's special damages will
usually be incidental expenses incurred as a result of the breach. 4 5 This kind
37. See 5 CORBIN, supra note 9, § 1064; Sweet, supra note 3, at 105-08.
38. Lee Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Kaiden, 32 Md. App. 556, 363 A.2d 270, 20 U.C.C. Rep.

Serv. (Callaghan) 117 (1976).
39. Id., 363 A.2d at 274, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 122-23.

40. Id.
41. See Kaiserman v. Martin J. Ain, Ltd., 112 Misc. 2d 768, 450 N.Y.S.2d 135, 31 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1374 (1981) (failure to accept delivery of new automobile).
42. See Dow Coming Corp. v. Capitol Aviation, Inc. v. North Rockwell Corp., 411 F.2d
622, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 589 (7th Cir. 1969) (seller breached promise to deliver
new, specially built airplane); Speedi Lubrication Centers, Inc. v. Atlas Match Corp., 595
S.W.2d 912, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 556 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no
writ) (buyer breached contract for specially ordered goods); see also Coast Trading Co. v.
Parmac, Inc., 21 Wash. App. 896, 587 P.2d 1071, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1047
(1978) (15% cancellation fee upheld as valid liquidated damages, and not penalty, when actual
damages were demonstrated to be considerably in excess of stipulated fee).
43. California & Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. Sun Ship, Inc., 794 F.2d 1433, 1 U.C.C. Rep.

Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1211 (9th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 200 (1987); Grumman Flexible Corp. v. City of Long Beach, 505 F. Supp. 623, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1248

(E.D.N.Y. 1980).
44. On occasion sellers do suffer special damages that can be protected by a liquidated
damages clause. See Pasquale Food Co. v. L & H Int. Airmotive, Inc., 51 Ala. App. 127, 283
So. 2d 438, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 622 (1973) (financing costs); Equitable Lumber
Corp. v. IPA Land Dev. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 516, 344 N.E.2d 391, 381 N.Y.S.2d 459, 18 U.C.C.

Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 273 (1976) (attorney's fees).
45. See U.C.C. § 2-710 (1978).

1090

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41

of out-of-pocket loss almost always is easy to prove. A buyer's entitlement
to liquidated damages will usually occur in a commercial contract situation.
Consumer-buyers do not customarily have the opportunity to negotiate for
inclusion of a liquidated damage provision in their contracts.
One commentator has suggested that cases involving marketing or commodity cooperatives represent a separate category of goods cases in which
liquidated damage provisions are regularly enforced. 46 In such cases, the
liquidated damage provision usually merely states that, in the event of
breach, the market price of the goods at a certain date will measure the
damages. 47 Such clauses do not liquidate damages at an amount different
from those that would be recoverable under the Code's market formulae in
sections 2-708 and 2-713. They merely set the time for tender of performance under the contract of sale and thereby establish the time for calculating
market-based damages under the applicable Code formula.
II.

A.

"CRITERIA"

OF SECTION

2-718

Section 2-718(1): In General

Section 2-718 would appear to apply to any transaction in goods, whether
a sale, lease, or bailment. 48 Section 2-718 will have no application, of course,
until a liquidated damage provision is found in the agreement. 49 Code cases
interpreting section 2-718 are sparse because liquidated damage provisions
have limited applicability to goods transactions. 50 The courts, however,
have indicated a willingness to apply the statute in non-Code cases. 51
Section 2-718(1) apparently provides three criteria for judging the validity
of a liquidated damage provision. These criteria are that the stipulated sum
be reasonable in light of: (1) the anticipated or actual harm caused by the
breach; (2) the difficulties of proof of loss; and (3) the difficulty of otherwise
obtaining an adequate remedy. 52 Arguably, the second sentence of the statute establishes a fourth, overarching criterion. The second sentence states:
"A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty."' 53 At least one court has found this to be a separate test that must be
54
met to validate a liquidated damages provision.
46. See Sweet, supra note 3, at 106.

47. See Ray Farmers Union Elevator Co. v. Weyrauch, 238 N.W.2d 47, 18 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 683 (N.D. 1975); Sawyer Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. Linke, 231 N.W.2d 791,
17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 102 (N.D. 1975); Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n v.

Nelson, 223 N.W.2d 494, 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 139 (N.D. 1974).
48. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1978).
49. See Rangen, Inc. v. Valley Trout Farms, Inc., 658 P.2d 955, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 52 (Idaho 1982).
50. See supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text.

51. See E. C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co., 551 F.2d 1026, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1061 (5th Cir. 1977); Illingsworth v. Bushong, 297 Or. 675, 688 P.2d 379, 39
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 903 (1984). But see Feary v. Aaron Burglar Alarm, Inc., 332
Cal. App. 3d 553, 108 Cal. Rptr. 242, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 881 (1973).

52. U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1978).
53. Id.

54. Equitable Lumber Corp. v. IPA Land Dev. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 516, 344 N.E.2d 391,
381 N.Y.S.2d 459, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 273 (1976).
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Whether the criteria be three or four, it seems clear that the sole test for
validity under section 2-718 is reasonableness. This interpretation gives the
statute its literal reading. In this respect, the "criteria" are not criteria at all,
but rather are factors that the court should look to in making its judgment
regarding the reasonableness of the clause. 55 Thus, a court should not invalidate the clause merely because one or more of the factors cannot be proved
in a particular case. The Official Comment supports this interpretation:
"Under subsection (1) liquidated damage clauses are allowed where the
amount involved is reasonable in the light of the circumstances of the case.
The subsection sets forth explicitly the elements to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a liquidated damage clause." '5 6
Section 2-718 represents a marked departure from the basic common law
rules regarding liquidated damage provisions. It abandons entirely the socalled "intention of the parties" test, 57 and it specifically allows the court to
focus on the actual damages suffered in determining the reasonableness of
the clause. 58 Nevertheless, the statute is confusing in its wording and
presents difficulty in its application to actual fact situations. For these reasons, it is not surprising to find courts turning to the old common law rule
structure when judging the validity of liquidated provisions. 59 The new Restatement of Contracts and the cases following its precepts may provide guidance to the courts in the future in interpreting and applying section 2-718.
B. Restatement (Second) of Contracts
Section 356 of Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of
loss. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty. 6°
The commentary to the provision states the theory behind allowing parties
to liquidate damages:
The enforcement of such provisions for liquidated damages saves the
time of courts, juries, parties and witnesses and reduces the expense of
litigation. This is especially important if the amount in controversy is
small. However, the parties to a contract are not free to provide a penalty for its breach. The central objective behind the system of contract
remedies is compensatory, not punitive. Punishment of a promisor for
having broken his promise has no justification on either economic or
other grounds and a term providing such a penalty is unenforceable on
55. See W.
(1982).

HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES

§ 2-718:01, at 425-26

56. U.C.C. § 2-718 comment 1 (1978).
57. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
58. See Note, supra note 34, at 871.
59. See Grumman Flexible Corp. v. City of Long Beach, 505 F. Supp. 623, 31 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1248 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Lee Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Kaiden, 32 Md. App.
556, 363 A.2d 270, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 117 (1976).
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1979).
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grounds of public policy. 6'
The new Restatement provision was drafted "to harmonize" with section
2-718(1) of the Code. 62 The new Restatement, however, has dropped the
"inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy" 63 language of the Code. The thought presumably is that the language
adds nothing and is redundant to the "difficulties of proof of loss" 64 language in the provision.
The Restatement, then, suggests a two-factor test for determining the reasonableness of a liquidated damage provision. This test looks to (1) the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach; and (2) the difficulty of proof of
loss. 65 These factors are not independent but rather interrelate.
The greater the difficulty either of proving that loss has occurred or
of establishing its amount with the requisite certainty .... the easier it
is to show that the amount fixed is reasonable. If the difficulty of proof
of loss is great, considerable latitude is allowed in the approximation of
anticipated or actual harm. If, on the other hand, the difficulty of proof
of loss is slight, less latitude is allowed in that approximation. If, to
a provitake an extreme case, it is clear that no loss at all has occurred,
66
sion fixing a substantial sum as damages is unenforceable.
We are told by the commentary, however, to read literally in the disjunctive the first factor of reasonableness in terms of anticipated or actual
harm. 67 Courts should hold valid the clause if it is reasonable when compared to either. Thus, the sum stipulated "is reasonable to the extent that it
approximates the actual loss that has resulted from the particular breach,
even though it may not approximate the loss that might have been antici'68 Reference is made to an illustration
pated under other possible breaches."
69
that supports the statement.
The commentary then attempts to address the hard case from an equitable
standpoint of when the sum is reasonable in terms of the anticipated, but not
the actual, harm. The commentary states that "the amount fixed is reasonable to the extent that it approximates the loss anticipated at the time of the
contract, even though it may not approximate the actual loss. '' 7° The commentary cites the following illustration to support the proposition:
A contracts to build a grandstand for B's race track for $1,000,000 by
a specified date and to pay $1,000 a day for every day's delay in completing it. A delays completion for ten days. If $1,000 is not unreasonable in the light of the anticipated loss and the actual loss to B is difficult
61. Id. § 356 comment a.
62. Id. § 356 reporter's note; see Note, supra note 34, at 862, for a helpful, in-depth analysis of § 356.
63. U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1978).
64. Id.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1979).
66. Id. § 356 comment b.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. § 356 comment b, illustration 2.
70. Id. § 356 comment b.
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to prove, A's promise is not a term providing for a penalty and its en7
forcement is not precluded on grounds of public policy. '
The Restatement thus equivocates on the most difficult liquidated damage
situation, one in which actual damages may be readily proved to be much
less than the amount liquidated. This particular kind of case often produced
unfair results under the common law rule structure. 72 The new Restatement
does not speak to this situation either in commentary or by illustration. The
hope is that the courts will read the provision, and section 2-718 for that
matter, so as to hold the clause invalid in such cases. The over-arching test
is reasonableness and courts should read the factors of the test together.
Since the second factor, difficulty of proof of loss, is entirely absent, courts
should find the clause unreasonable even though it approximates the anticipated (but not actual) loss. This hope, however, may be somewhat
73
optimistic.
C. Judicial Interpretation of Section 2-718(1)
Section 2-718(1) is written in such a way as to allow the courts great flexibility in determining the validity of liquidated damage provisions. The sole
test is reasonableness, with various factors supplied to guide a court in its
determination. As with so many of the Code's provisions, one must follow
closely the case law encrustation on the statute to understand its parameters.
Unfortunately, to date the cases on the whole are a sparse and uneven lot.
Two highly respected courts on opposite sides of the continent have provided, a decade apart, two of the more helpful judicial interpretations.
The first court to give detailed consideration to the Code's liquidated damage statute was the New York Court of Appeals in Equitable Lumber Corp.
v. IPA Land Development Corp.74 The case involved a sale of lumber and
building materials to a builder and developer. The buyer refused to pay for
accepted goods, and the seller brought suit for the purchase price and attorney's fees stipulated in the contract. The contract provided that, upon default, the buyer would be liable for attorney's fees and that "such reasonable
counsel fee is hereby agreed to be thirty (30%) per cent."' 75 The trial court
refused to enforce the provisions and allowed recovery of only the reasonable
value of the legal services rendered. 76 After a hearing, the court determined
that a maximum amount of ten hours was required to handle the matter
properly and awarded the seller an amount of $450 (approximately 11% of
the amount received). 77 On appeal, the appellate division modified the award
71. Id. § 356 comment b, illustration 3.
72. See supra notes 12-34 and accompanying text.
73. See California & Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. Sun Ship, Inc., 794 F.2d 1433, 1 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1211 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 200 (1987); see also infra
notes 87-97 for a further discussion of CaliforniaHawaiian Sugar Co.
74. 38 N.Y.2d 516, 344 N.E.2d 391,381 N.Y.S.2d 459, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
273 (1976).
75. Id., 344 N.E.2d at 393, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 461, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 275.
76. Id., 344 N.E.2d at 394, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 461-62, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at
276.
77. Id., 344 N.E.2d at 394, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 462, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 276.
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to $750.78 The court of appeals, on further appeal, held section 2-718 directly applicable to the case and stated:
At the time of contracting the attorney's fees were arguably incapable
of estimation. The amount ... would vary with the nature of the defaulting party's breach. For instance, a greater amount would be
charged in the event that litigation was necessitated as opposed to settlement; and additional charges might be required for possible appellate
79
procedures.
The court reasoned that, since section 2-718 was applicable to the case,
the reasonable value of the legal services was not the appropriate measure of
damages.8 0 Instead, the question was whether the stipulated amount was a
reasonable estimate of anticipated harm or, alternatively, whether the stipulated amount was reasonable in terms of the actual arrangement the seller
had with its attorneys. The court said:
Under both the "actual" and "anticipated" harm tests, the time expended by the attorney in obtaining collection is not necessarily the correct measure of damages, since an attorney would be expected to bill his
client on a contingent fee basis. The liquidated damage provision would
prove to be a reasonable pre-estimate of anticipated harm if it is related
to the normal
contingent fee charged by attorneys in the collection
81
context.
With respect to the factor of "actual harm," the court said: "On the other
hand, if plaintiff actually entered into a contingent fee arrangement with its
attorney for 30%, then the actual harm suffered by plaintiff would be consistent with the liquidated damages provision."'8 2 The court thus applied the
"anticipated or actual harm" language in section 2-718 in the disjunctive.
Compliance could be had by a showing of reasonableness in terms of either
the anticipated or actual harm. The court expressly recognized that this was
a departure from pre-Code, New York law, which focused entirely on anticipated harm. 83 Nevertheless, the court reasoned that the clause must also
pass muster under the second sentence in section 2-718(1) even if the clause
was reasonable in terms of the anticipated or actual harm.8 4 The court said:
However, even if the "actual harm" test is satisfied, it is then necessary, pursuant to the second sentence of § 2-718(1), to determine
whether the liquidated damages provision is so unreasonably large as to
be void as a penalty. If plaintiff entered into an exorbitant fee arrangement with counsel, knowing that defendant would suffer the consequences, then the liquidated damage provision would be void as a "term
fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages. The commercial practice
78. Id.
79. Id., 344 N.E.2d at 396-97, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 464, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at
280. But is not the question whether the fees would likely be difficult to measure at the time of
breach?

80. Id., 344 N.E.2d at 397, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 465, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 280.
81. Id.
82. Id.

83. Id., 344 N.E.2d at 385, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 462-63, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at
277-78.
84. Id., 344 N.E.2d at 397, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 465, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 280.
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of attorneys in the area of debtor-creditor relations is relevant ...
While plaintiff may enter into any fee arrangement it wishes with counsel, it should not be permitted to manipulate the actual damage incurred by burdening the defendant with an exorbitant fee
85
arrangement.
The court remanded the case for a determination of whether the clause was
reasonable in terms of the anticipated or actual harm and the normal
86
charges of attorneys in the locale for collection work.
The court's analysis is correct only as far as it goes. The court failed to
consider reasonableness in light of two other factors in section 2-718, the
difficulty of proving loss and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise
obtaining an adequate remedy. With respect to the "inconvenience" factor,
since the buyer had agreed contractually to pay reasonable attorney's fees,
an adequate remedy existed. With respect to the "difficulty" factor, the seller
would have faced no difficulty in proving to the penny the exact amount of
attorney's fees actually incurred. There is simply no reason to enforce a
liquidated damage provision in situations in which the precise injury can be
easily proved. Although this particular case probably would have come out
the same regardless of whether the court enforced the liquidated sum (the
actual and the liquidated damages being the same), the court's decision is
dangerous precedent for future cases in which readily provable actual damages are much less than the sum liquidated. When such a case presents itself, perhaps the court will turn its decision on the other factors of
reasonableness listed in the statute.
A much more provocative situation was presented to the Ninth Circuit in
California & HawaiianSugar Co. v. Sun Ship, Inc.87 California & Hawaiian
Sugar Company (C & H), an agricultural cooperative, had a pressing need
for a vessel to transport raw sugar from its plantations in Hawaii to the
mainland. It commissioned the building of a hybrid vessel, a tug of catamaran design to be connected to a barge, to produce a tug barge. Sun contracted to build the barge and Halter to build the tug. The contract with
Sun specified a delivery date of June 30, 1981, and contained a clause liquidating damages for delay at $17,000 per day. Sun breached the contract by
not completing the barge until March 16, 1982. Halter, however, did not
complete the tug until July 15, 1982. C & H settled its claim against Halter,
and the litigation involved only Sun.
Sun contended that the liquidated damage provision of $17,000 per day
was an unenforceable penalty. Sun emphasized that the barge was useless to
C & H without the tug and alleged that C & H would suffer no injury until
Halter delivered the tug. Since Sun delivered the barge before Halter delivered the tug, C & H suffered no damages as a result of Sun's breach.
Although the court found Sun's argument "seductive," the court held the
85. Id.

86. Id., 344 N.E.2d at 397, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 465, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 28081.
87. 794 F.2d 1433, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1211 (9th Cir. 1986), cert denied,
108 S. Ct. 200 (1987).
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clause valid. 88 The court ruled that the clause was clearly reasonable in light
of the anticipated loss. 89 C & H had storage in Hawaii for only about onequarter of its sugar crops. Without proper storage, sugar quickly goes to
waste. C & H could avoid such loss only by having shipping available as
promised by its contract with Sun.
In reaching its conclusion, the court found the disjunctive language of
"anticipated or actual harm" in section 2-718 to be deliberate. 90 The language was satisfied by the reasonably anticipated harm to C & H. The court
also relied on the new Restatement of Contracts, which would validate a
provision that "approximates the loss anticipated at the time of the making
of the contract, even though it may not approximate the actual loss."91 The
court recognized, however, that the Restatement apparently would uphold a
provision that did not approximate actual damages only in cases in which
92
the actual damage was uncertain or could not otherwise be easily proved.
Sun argued that it was clear from the record that C & H suffered no damages as a result of the breach because C & H could not have used the barge
prior to the time Sun actually delivered it. Further, Sun contended that the
parties intended the clause to operate only if the tug were available to integrate with the barge. Accordingly, Sun urged the court to follow the Restatement provision where "it is clear that no loss at all has occurred, a
provision fixing a substantial sum as damages is unenforceable. '93 The court
rejected these arguments. It said:
The Restatement, however, deals with a case where the defaulting
contractor was alone in his default. We deal with a case of concurrent
defaults. If we were to be so literal-minded as to follow the Restatement here, we would have to conclude that because both parties were in
default, C and H suffered no damage until one party performed....
The continued default of both parties would
operate to take each of
94
them off the hook. That cannot be the law.
The court thus found that C & H had suffered a substantial actual loss,
although on the unique facts of the case all of that loss was not solely attributable to Sun. 95 The court then emphasized the importance of enforcing
liquidated damage clauses in cases in which actual damages are uncertain.
The court said:
Where damages are real but difficult to prove, injustice will be done
the injured party if the court substitutes the requirements of judicial
88. Id. at 1439, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1219-20.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1436, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1215.

91.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 356 comment b (1979); see also supra

notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
92. 794 F.2d at 1436-37, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1215-16; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 comment b, illustration 4 (1979); supra notes 60-73 and

accompanying text.
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 comment b (1979).
94. 794 F.2d at 1437, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1216-17.
95. Id. at 1437-38, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1217.
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proof for the parties' own informed agreement as to what is a reasonable measure of damages....
Proof of this loss is difficult-as difficult, perhaps, as proof of loss
would have been if the sugar crop had been delivered late because shipping was missing. Whatever the loss, the parties had promised each
other that $17,000 per day was a reasonable measure. The court must
decline to substitute
the requirements of judicial proof for the parties'
96
own conclusion.
The court was apparently of the opinion that $17,000 per day was not an
unreasonable approximation of the loss actually suffered.
The decision in the C & H case represents an excellent analysis of the
reasonableness test of section 2-718 and of the interplay between the various
factors of reasonableness presented by the statute. One is left with some
feeling that C & H may have received a windfall from enforcement of the
liquidated damage provision, particularly since we are not told the amount
received by C & H from its settlement with Halter. 97 This, however, is the
kind of uncertainty that should be resolved by a liquidated damage provision
agreed to by arms' length negotiation. Presumably the case would have been
decided differently had the evidence clearly showed that C & H had suffered
no loss or one that was calculable at an amount much less than the liquidated sum.
D. Anticipated or Actual Harm
As discussed previously, 98 the reasonableness factors listed in section 2718(1) are interrelated; to discuss any one of them independently is, thus,
somewhat misleading. 99 Nevertheless, the "anticipated or actual harm" factor is probably the most important of those factors listed because the textbook example of a penalty is a payment of an amount wholly
disproportionate to the harm that has been caused. At least this example is
true when the amount liquidated greatly exceeds the injury. When the converse exists, the Code suggests that limiting, damages to the smaller liquidated sum might also be unconscionable. 100 Further, in at least one kind of
case the "harm" factor may become independent of the others and, in and of
itself, invalidate a liquidated provision. If the provision approximates
neither the anticipated nor the actual harm, courts should hold the clause
per se unreasonable regardless of the difficulties of proving loss or of obtaining another remedy. Pre-Code cases reached this conclusion.101
96. Id. at 1438-39, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1218-19.
97. C & H received a judgment in excess of $4,000,000 under the liquidated damages
clause. The contract prices of the barge ($25,405,000) and of the tug ($20,350,000) totaled
almost $46,000,000.
98. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
99. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 comment b (1979).
100. See U.C.C. § 2-718 comment 1, which states: "A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is expressly made void as a penalty. An unreasonably small amount would be
subject to similar criticism and might be stricken under the section on unconscionable contracts or clauses." Id.
101. See Woodner v. Sankin, 188 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C. (1960), aff'd, 289 F.2d 873 (D.C.
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One can read the word "harm" itself as ambiguous. Does it include all
injuries or only those injuries recoverable under the usual damage rules regarding foreseeability, certainty, and mitigation of damages? The better
view is that the reference is to all harm, regardless of whether it would be
compensable absent the liquidated damages clause.' 0 2 Without doubt, the
fundamental purpose of agreed damages is to relieve the aggrieved party
from the burden of proving uncertain damages. It also seems reasonable to
allow the damages agreement to insulate the aggrieved party from meeting
the amorphous standard of foreseeability and from countering allegations
that the agreed damages could have been reasonably avoided.
With its "anticipated or actual harm" standard for reasonableness, the
03
Code potentially represents a significant departure from the common law.
The majority common law rule focused primarily on anticipated harm.10 4
Prior to the Code, however, jurisdictions were split on the role that actual
damages should have in a determination of the validity of liquidated damage
provisions. The majority of courts considered the extent of actual harm a
factor they would consider in determining what losses might have been reasonably anticipated at the formation of the contract. 05 A minority of
courts, however, excluded all evidence regarding actual harm even for the
purpose of determining what damages could reasonably have been anticipated. 10 6 Section 2-718 does not expressly resolve this conflict. Although
section 2-718 does refer to actual harm, the reference is in the disjunctive
and, therefore, can be read to exclude evidence of actual harm if the clause is
found to be reasonable in terms of the anticipated loss.
Cir. 1961); Norwalk Door Closer Co. v. Eagle Lock & Screw Co., 153 Conn. 681, 220 A.2d
263 (1966).
102. See Wassenaar v. Panos, 111 Wis. 2d 518, 331 N.W.2d 357 (1983); J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14-31, at 643 (1987); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.5 (1973); see also Nautilus Training Center No. 2, Inc. v. Seafirst
Leasing Corp., 647 S.W.2d 344, 347 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ) (when valid
liquidated damages clause exists, court will enforce it and need not consider issue of mitigation); Robinson v. Granite Equip. Leasing Corp., 553 S.W.2d 633, 634 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e) (no duty to mitigate liquidated damages.)
103. See Equitable Lumber Corp. v. IPA Land Dev. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 516, 344 N.E.2d
459, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 273 (1976); Note, supra note 34, at 871-72.
104. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105 (1907); Frick Co. v. Rubel Corp.,
62 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1933); United States v. J.D. Streett & Co., 151 F. Supp. 469 (E.D. Mo.
1957), modified, 256 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1958); Norwalk Door Closer Co. v. Eagle Lock &
Screw Co., 153 Conn. 681, 220 A.2d 263 (1966); see supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Woodner v. Sankin, 188 F. Supp. 259, 260 (D.D.C. 1960) ("Liquidated damages in an amount that has no bearing and no relation to the actual damages suffered, and in
an amount that is conceivably larger than any actual damages that are likely to be sustained,
may be deemed to be a penalty and a penalty is not enforceable."), aff'd, 289 F.2d 873 (D.C.
Cir. 1961).
106. See, e.g., Frick Co. v. Rubel Corp., 62 F.2d 765, 767 (2d Cir. 1933) (evidence as to
actual loss irrelevant); Bryon Jackson Co. v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 665, 667 (S.D. Cal.
1940) ("Recovery of liquidated damages is allowed upon mere proof of an explicit contractual
undertaking to that effect. No proof that in fact, damage did not flow from the breach is
allowed."); see also United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105, 119 (1907) ("Courts
...have now become strongly inclined to allow parties to make their own contracts, and to
carry out their intentions over when it would result in the recovery of an amount stated as
liquidated damages ... without proof of the damages actually sustained.").
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Commentators have suggested that the disjunctive phrasing, "anticipated
or actual" harm, is subject to two interpretations. Under one interpretation,
if the stipulated amount is disproportionate to either the actual or anticipated amount, courts should then invalidate the clause.10 7 This reading
overlooks the disjunctive language of the phrase and would lead to absurd
results in cases in which the clause reasonably approximates actual, although
not anticipated, damages. Such a situation could arise, for example, when
the clause was too broadly drafted so that it stipulated a single sum to cover
a multitude of breaches that would potentially cause varying degrees of injury. The courts would invalidate the clause even though it approximated
the injury actually caused. 0 8 Professor Hawkland well states the impracticality of such an interpretation:
[I]t should not matter that the predicted loss did not accord with the
common viewpoint of prudent businessmen at the time the agreement
Indeed,
was made, because subsequent events have proved it right ....
there would be no sense in striking down such a clause, because that
would leave the court in a position requiring it to determine damages
under usual legal tests, which would bring it to the same dollar amount
as the liquidated clause. 109
A second suggested interpretation would allow a court to uphold a clause
if either the actual or anticipated harm corresponds with the amount stipulated. 110 This reading follows literally the disjunctive language of section 2718(1). This interpretation, however, should not be taken out of context
with the other factors of reasonableness in section 2-718(1). Otherwise, unfair results will obtain in cases in which the liquidated damage clause greatly
exceeds the injury actually suffered. Such cases have always been the hard
liquidated damages cases. Although the stipulated sum may approximate
the anticipated loss, it makes no sense to enforce the clause if actual damages
are readily provable at a different amount. To enforce the clause in such
cases is to impose a penalty.
Thus, a third and better interpretation would hold the clause suspect in
cases in which it apparently does not reasonably approximate the actual
harm. In such cases, the court should turn to the other factors in section 2718 to determine the reasonableness of the clause. Most important in this
107. See 5 CORBIN, supra note 9, § 1063, at 367; D. DOBBS, supra note 102, § 12.5, at 823.
108. See Bradford v. New York Times Co., 501 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1974); Mandle v. Owens,
330 N.E.2d 362 (Ind. App. 1975), transferdenied, 265 Ind. 252, 353 N.E.2d 465 (1976); Mayfield v. Hicks, 575 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
109. W. HAWKLAND, supra note 55, § 2-718:02, at 426-27 (1982).

110. See California & Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. Sun Ship, Inc., 794 F.2d 1433, 1 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1211 (9th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 200 (1987); Grumman Flxible Corp. v. City of Long Beach, 505 F. Supp. 623, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1248

(E.D.N.Y. 1980); Equitable Lumber Corp. v. IPA Land Dev. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 516, 344
N.E.2d 391, 381 N.Y.S.2d 459, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 273 (1976); Stock Shop, Inc.

v. Bozell & Jacobs, Inc., 126 Misc. 2d 95, 481 N.Y.S.2d 269, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1295 (1984); see also W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 171 (1964) ("[T] test of the validity of an agreement provision is validated by
establishing that either the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach bears a reasonable
relationship to the liquidated damages.").
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regard would be the difficulty of proving loss. If damages can be readily
proved, then a court should not enforce the clause merely because it approximates a loss that did not occur. A court should never knowingly allow a
liquidated damages clause to operate as a penalty. It is simply no response
to say that the parties have agreed to the amount liquidated. In liquidating
damages the parties assumed that the loss caused by the breach would be
uncertain in amount and difficult to prove. They intended the clause only as
approximation of that loss and not as an allocation of risk. As it turns out,
the parties were mistaken in their assumption. Principles of freedom of contract should not operate to enforce penal damages when such was not the
intent of either party. If the parties had actually intended to allocate the risk
of penal damages, the court would certainly invalidate the agreement under
any interpretation of section 2-718 or of the common law.
There is thus no reason to allow a clause liquidating damages to operate as
a penalty subsequent to the breach if actual damages can be readily
proved.IlI Courts should always restrict liquidated damage provisions to
situations in which the anticipation of the parties at the time of contracting
turns out to be true; that is, to situations in which the actual damages caused
are uncertain or otherwise are difficult to prove. For this reason, the "diffioften will
culties of proof of loss" factor of reasonableness in section 2-718(1)
1 12
be of equal importance to that of "anticipated or actual harm."'
E. Difficulties of Proofof Loss
The classic reason for enforcing liquidated damage provisions is that damages are uncertain or otherwise difficult to prove. 113 Only when damages are
uncertain should courts allow the parties by agreement to usurp the judicial
function of measuring damages in a given case. Section 2-718 carries this
by listing as a key factor of reasonableness "the difficulties of
theme forward 114
proof of loss.''
The key question presented by the "difficulty" factor is the time at which
the difficulty is to be determined, that of contracting, or of breach, or of trial.
Unfortunately, the majority of courts has historically viewed the situation at
the time of contracting. 1 5 This common law rule was based on a misread111. Professor Honnold rejected an interpretation that would invalidate a clause that is
disproportionate to actual damages if it approximated anticipated damages. 1 NEW YORK
LAW REVISION REPORT ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 581 (1955); see W. HAWK-

LAND, supra note 55, § 2-718:02, at 427 (1982). The professor's position is certainly correct
for situations in which the actual loss is difficult to prove.
112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 comment b (1979):
A determination whether the amount fixed is a penalty turns on a combination

of ... two factors. If the difficulty of proof of loss is great, considerable latitude
is allowed in the approximation of anticipated or actual harm. If, on the other

hand, the difficulty of proof of loss is slight, less latitude is allowed in that approximation. If, to take an extreme case, it is clear that no loss at all has occurred, a provision fixing a substantial sum as damages is unenforceable.
Id.
113. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339(1)(b) (1932).

114. U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1978).
115. See 5 CORBIN, supra note 9, § 1060, at 350; supra notes 15-29 and accompanying text.

1988]

LIQUIDA TED DAMAGES

1101

ing of the original Restatement of Contracts, which courts often cited to
support the rule. The Restatement stated that agreements fixing damages
were not enforceable unless "the harm that is caused by the breach is one
that is incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation." 1 6 This language
looks obviously to the actual injury, rather than that anticipated. The comment to the provision makes the conclusion all the more clear:
If the parties honestly but mistakenly suppose that a breach will
cause harm that will be incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation, when in fact the breach causes no harm at all or none that is incapable of accurate estimation without difficulty, their advance agreement
fixing the amount to be paid as damages for the breach is within the rule
17
stated in Subsection (1) and is not enforceable.'
The new Restatement takes something of a middle ground, depending upon
the degree of difficulty. It provides:
If the difficulty of proof of loss is great, considerable latitude is allowed in the approximation of anticipated or actual harm. If, on the
other hand, the difficulty of proof of loss is slight, less latitude is allowed in that approximation. If, to take an extreme case, it is clear that
no loss at all has occurred, a provision fixing a substantial sum as damages is unenforceable." 18
To date no court has directly addressed the question of when one measures "the difficulties of proof of loss" under section 2-718. Commentators
have divided on the question.' '9
The new Restatement, which represents an attempt to parallel section 2718,120 provides the best resolution of the matter. Courts should never enforce a liquidated damage provision when actual damages are easily proved.
The difficulty of proving loss and the accuracy of the estimate of the parties,
however, will usually be a matter of degree. ' 2' The Code provides both sell116. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339(1)(b) (1932).
117. Id. § 339 comment e.
118. Id. § 356 comment b. Compare id. illustrations 3, 4 with § 356. Illustration 3
provides:
A contracts to build a grandstand for B's race track for $1,000,000 by a specified date and to pay $1,000 a day for every day's delay in completing it. A delays
completion for ten days. If $1,000 is not unreasonable in the light of the anticipated loss and the actual loss to B is difficult to prove, A's promise is not a term
providing for a penalty and its enforcement is not precluded on grounds of public policy.
Id. § 356 comment b, illustration 3. Illustration 4 provides:
The facts being otherwise as stated in Illustration 3, B is delayed for a month
in obtaining permission to operate his race track so that it is certain that A's
delay of ten days caused him no loss at all. Since the actual loss to B is not
difficult to prove, A's promise is a term providing for a penalty and is unenforceable on grounds of public policy.
Id. § 356 comment b, illustration 4.
119. See Comment, Liquidated Damages. A Comparison of the Common Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1349, 1359 (1976) (time of breach); Sweet,
supra note 3, at 109 (time of contracting); see also W. HAWKLAND, supra note 55, § 2-718:03,
at 429-30 (time should be time of contracting).
120. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 Reporter's Note (1979).
121. See D. DOBBS, supra note 102, § 12.5, at 822 (any degree of difficulty should be
enough to uphold liquidated damages clause).
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ers and buyers a panorama of accessible damage remedies and a rule of law
that relaxes the certainty requirement for proving loss.122 The net result is
that actual damages will usually be reasonably susceptible of proof, and
courts will rarely enforce liquidated damage provisions in sale of goods
cases. 1 23 That is as it should be.

If proving damages presents no apparent difficulty and the liquidated
damage clause is out of line with the damages actually suffered, no reason
exists for enforcing the clause. Conversely, if actual damages can be readily
proved, but the clause is apparently a reasonable approximation of the loss,
courts should not require proof of damages and should enforce the clause.
Once the party seeking to enforce the liquidated damage clause has made a
basic showing that the provision was part of the agreement, the burden of
going forward with proof of unreasonableness should fall on the other party.
Unfortunately, this allocation presents one party with the ostensibly difficult
task of proving the other party's damages. The task, however, is not to
prove the actual loss with precision. The burden should only be to raise
credible evidence that the pre-estimate is well out of line with the actual loss.
In most cases in which this situation arises, that burden should not be difficult. Those jurisdictions that historically have looked to the time of breach
to ascertain difficulty have demonstrated little trouble with having the party
who defends against an agreement liquidating damages prove unreasonableness.124 In cases of doubt either as to the accuracy of the amount stipulated
or as to the difficulty of proving actual loss, courts should enforce the agreed
clause.
The old rule that ignored the ease of proof of actual damages when judging the validity of a liquidated damage provision was based on a freedom of
contract philosophy, 125 the idea that courts should enforce an agreement
according to its terms. This philosophy is misfocused. Properly construed,
a liquidated damage provision does not represent an agreement to allocate
risks, because it is not an agreement that one party will pay a penalty. Both
pre-Code law and the Code itself would void such an agreement.1 26 An
agreement that provides for penal damages is an unconscionable attempt to
modify remedies and should also fail under section 2-719 on agreed remedies. When parties validly stipulate as to damages, they are required to
make a reasonable approximation and to base that approximation on an assumption that the damages will be uncertain and difficult to prove. If in
122. U.C.C. § 1-106 (1978).
123. See supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text; see also Comment, supra note 119, at
1359 (since market value of goods at time of breach is ascertainable, valid liquidated damage
provision under Code is rare).
124. See Johnson Engineers, Inc. v. Tri-Water Supply Corp., 582 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Tex.

Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ) (burden of proof was that stipulated amount did not fall
within "permissible range" of actual damages).
125. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105 (1907); United States v. J.D.
Streett & Co., 151 F. Supp. 469 (E.D. Mo. 1957).
126. See U.C.C. § 1-106 (1978), which states that "neither consequential or special nor
penal damages may be had except as specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of law."
Id.
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actuality no such difficulty arises upon breach and the parties' assumption
has proved to be mistaken, courts should enforce the agreed damages no
more than any other contract provision that is found to be premised upon
mutual mistake.
The best Code case to date demonstrating the impact of the "difficulty of
proof of loss" factor is Equitable Lumber Corp. v. IPA Land Development
Corp.,'127 discussed above. 128 In Equitable Lumber the court found that the
liquidated damage provision was clearly a reasonable approximation of damages that the breach would likely cause. The seller argued that, since the
buyer had no use for the barge prior to the time the seller delivered it, the
buyer suffered no actual loss. The court did not dismiss this argument as
irrelevant, which it would have done had it regarded section 2-718 as being
concerned entirely with reasonableness at the time of contracting. Instead,
the court looked to the actual injury suffered and then rejected the seller's
argument on the unique facts of the case.1 29
F. Inconvenience or Nonfeasibility of Otherwise Obtaining
an Adequate Remedy
The final factor listed in section 2-718(1) for judging reasonableness is
"the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy." 1 30 This factor is new, having had no pre-Code counterpart. No court
to date has directed its attention to it. Its meaning is not clear, but it probably represents nothing more than a particular example of "the difficulties of
proof of loss." If a plaintiff cannot prove his loss, he has little chance of
obtaining an adequate remedy. The new Restatement, which attempts to
parallel Section 2-718(1), does not include the "inconvenience" factor in its
provision because it finds the factor to be merely duplicative.1 31
One importance of the "inconvenience" language in section 2-718 is that it
emphasizes that courts should rarely enforce liquidated damage provisions
in sale of goods transactions. Whether one tests the efficacy of the clause at
the time of contracting or at the time of breach, it is not likely that the
parties would reasonably anticipate no adequate remedy for breach or that,
in fact, no adequate remedy exists after breach. Most goods sold in commerce have regularized markets against which parties can calculate the
32
damages. 1
As with judging the difficulties of proving loss, courts should judge the
inconvenience or nonfeasibility of obtaining a remedy based on the circum127. 38 N.Y.2d 516, 344 N.E.2d 391, 381 N.Y.S.2d 459, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
273 (1976); for a discussion of this case, see supra notes 74-86.

128. 838 N.Y.2d 516, 344 N.E.2d at 397, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 465, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 280-81.
129. Id.
130. U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1978).
131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 Reporter's Note (1979).
132. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text; see also Comment supra note 119, at
1363 (discusses inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining adequate remedy).
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stances existing at the time of trial. 133 Only at that time can courts determine the availability of an adequate remedy. What difference should it make
that the parties may have, quite reasonably, thought at the time of the contracting that a remedy might not be available? The only criticism of this
view is that it substantially restricts the enforceability of liquidated damage
provisions in sale of goods transactions.1 34 The criticism is misplaced. In
sales transactions of goods having established markets, rare will be the case
in which the parties at the time of contracting can reasonably anticipate the
lack of an available remedy. The Code provides a broad spectrum of reasonable remedies for sellers and buyers underscored by a fundamental principle
of compensation. 135 Courts should not sacrifice those remedies and that
principle to an erroneous assumption of the parties at the time of
contracting.
G. Liquidated Damages as an Exclusive Remedy
Once a liquidated damage clause has been shown to be part of the agreement, 13 6 it represents the exclusive remedy available to the aggrieved party,
who may not seek other damages or other legal remedies. This was the wellsettled rule at common law' 37 and is almost certainly the rule under section
2-718.
Section 2-718 contains no requirement that the parties expressly agree that
the remedy is exclusive. A liquidated damage clause, nevertheless, is an
agreed remedy, and section 2-719 provides that "resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive.' 38
To date, however, the courts have not read section 2-719 as placing a limitation on liquidated damage provisions. 139 In the words of one court, "a liquidated damage clause, without evidence to the contrary, is so inconsistent
with any other damage remedy as to require a conclusion that it contemplates exclusiveness." 140 Another court expressed its opinion as follows:
"We find it difficult to visualize a clearer way to express an exclusive limita133. Professor Hawkland originally held this view. W. HAWKLAND, supra note 110, at
172. Unfortunately, he recanted. W. HAWKLAND, supra note 55, § 2-718:04, at 430-31.
134. W. HAWKLAND, supra note 55, § 2-718:04, at 430; Comment, supra note 119, at 1363.
135. See U.C.C. § 1-106 (1978).
136. See Rangen, Inc. v. Valley Trout Farms, Inc., 658 P.2d 955, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 52 (Idaho 1983); Ray Farmers Union Elevator Co. v. Weyrauch, 238 N.W.2d 47,
18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 683 (N.D. 1975).
137. 5 CORBIN, supra note 9, § 1061, at 353; Comment, supra note 119, at 1367-80.
138. U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(b) (1978).
139. The best judicial analysis of this issue is in Ray Farmers Union Elevator Co. v.
Weyrauch, 238 N.W.2d 47, 49, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 683, 686 (N.D. 1975) ("Any
other conclusion would negate the purpose of [section 2-718(1)]."). The court, however, restricted its analysis to damage remedies, reserving judgment as to whether § 2-719 would require an expression of exclusivity to bar nondamage remedies such as specific performance,
injunction, rescission, etc. Id.; see Council Bros, Inc. v. Ray Burner Co., 473 F.2d 400, 11
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1126 (5th Cir. 1973).
140. Ray Farmers Union Elevator Co. v. Weyrauch, 238 N.W.2d 47, 50, 18 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 683, 687-88 (N.D. 1975).
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tion on the measure of damages" 14 1 than by liquidating them. The Code
cases to date are in uniform accord. 142
A different situation arises with respect to equitable remedies. The general rule at common law was that a liquidated damage provision did not bar
recourse to equitable remedies.' 4 3 A court in equity should not allow its
jurisdiction to be determined exclusively by private agreement, although
such an agreement is a factor to be considered. The few Code cases to date
indicate that the common law view will continue to prevail. 144 If the equitable remedy sought is one merely for lost expectation, such as specific performance, rather than one designed to punish wrongdoing, such as
constructive trust or equitable lien, the court will probably honor an express
agreement that the liquidated damage provision is the exclusive remedy.
Thus, one case held that a liquidated damage provision containing express
language that it was the exclusive remedy could preclude specific performance. 145 The court would honor the agreement because the agreement
should be interpreted as merely allowing the breaching party the privilege of
46
paying the agreed sum, rather than performing the agreement.'
H.

UnreasonablyLarge Liquidated Damages

After listing the factors courts should consider in determining the reasonableness of a liquidated damage provision, section 2-718(1) provides: "A
1 47
term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty."'
This language merely states the consequence if a court should find the provision unreasonably large in light of the factors of reasonableness listed in section 2-718(l).148
The one case that has directly addressed this provision reached the curious conclusion that it establishes an independent criterion that must be met
before a court may validate the liquidated damage clause.14 9 The court said:
"Having satisfied the test set forth in the first part of § 2-718(1), a liquidated
damages provision may nonetheless be invalidated under the last sentence of
141. Council Bros, Inc. v. Ray Burner Co., 473 F.2d 400,406, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1126, 1135 (5th Cir. 1973).
142. Id.; Dow Coming Corp. v. Capitol Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 622, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 589 (7th Cir. 1969); J.D. Pavlak, Ltd. v. William Davies, Co., 40 Ill. App. 3d 1,
351 N.E.2d 243, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 394 (1976); Ray Farmers Union Elevator
Co. v. Weyrauch, 238 N.W.2d 47, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 683 (N.D. 1975); Farmers
Union Grain Terminal Ass'n v. Nelson, 223 N.W.2d 494, 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
139 (N.D. 1974); Air Prods. & Chem., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206
N.W.2d 414, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 794 (1973).
143. Comment, supra note 119, at 1367-80.
144. Carolinas Cotton Growers Ass'n. v. Arnette, 371 F. Supp. 65 (D.S.C. 1974); Varner v.
B.L. Lanier Fruit Co., 370 So. 2d 61, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 716 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979); Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Scott, 311 So. 2d 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), cert.
denied, 328 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1976).
145. Carolinas Cotton Growers Ass'n. v. Arnette, 371 F. Supp. 65 (D.S.C. 1974)
146. Id. at 72-73.
147. U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1978).
148. Id.
149. Equitable Lumber Corp. v. IPA Land Dev. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 516, 344 N.E.2d at 395,
381 N.Y.S.2d at 463, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 278 (1976).
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the section if it is so unreasonably large that it serves as a penalty rather than
a good faith attempt to pre-estimate damages .. ."150 The court did not

explain how it could hold a clause "unreasonably large" once it had found
the same clause reasonable in terms of the factors listed in the first sentence
of section 2-718(1). Had the court not limited its inquiry to the anticipated
harm caused by the breach, the court's conclusion would be more understandable. Courts can sensibly read the second sentence of section 2-718 as
an independent test of reasonableness only if its reference is to the damages
that actually occurred. Thus, although the court may find a clause reasonable in terms of the factors listed in the first sentence to section 2-718, the
court may nevertheless invalidate the clause if it finds the clause unreasonably large in light of the damages that actually occur. For the reasons emphasized throughout this Article, an interpretation that focuses on the actual
harm is preferable.1 51
I. UnreasonablySmall Liquidated Damages
Although the Code provides that unreasonably large liquidated damages
are void as a penalty, the text to section 2-718(1) states no consequence for a
clause providing for unreasonably small liquidated damages. The Official
Comment to the provision fills the void: "A term fixing unreasonably large
liquidated damages is expressly made void as a penalty. An unreasonably
small amount would be subject to similar criticism and might be stricken
under the section on unconscionable contracts or clauses." 152 Thus, a party
limited to unreasonably small damages is penalized as much as one required
to pay unreasonably large damages, a result that may be unconscionable.
Professor Hawkland puts the matter well:
There is a vast difference in the pernicious effects of unreasonably
large and unreasonably small liquidated damages. Unreasonably large
liquidated damages have an in terrorem effect that strongly deters a
party from breaching his contract. Unreasonably small liquidated damages, on the other hand, tend to induce a party to breach a contract if
the alternative of performing it becomes even slightly disagreeable. The
first kind involves a penalty; the second involves an unconscionable limitation on remedies, depriving the aggrieved party of a fair quantum of
recovery. 153
A clause providing for unreasonably small liquidated damages is, in effect,
a limitation on remedies and courts should judge the clause under the standards of section 2-719, rather than under those of section 2-718. If one of
the parties alleges that the clause is unconscionable, the court should make a
distinction as to whether the unconscionability arises from the time of contracting or from the way the clause is operating in light of the damages that
have occurred. Section 2-302 governs unconscionability at the time of con150. 38 N.Y.2d 516, 344 N.E.2d at 395, 381 N.Y.S. 2d at 463, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 278 (1976).
151. See supra notes 48-135 and accompanying text.
152. U.C.C § 2-718 comment 1 (1978).
153. W. HAWKLAND, supra note 55, § 2-718:06, at 432-33.
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tracting and requires a separate hearing on unconscionability by the trial
court. 154 If the clause is acting in an unconscionable manner, a case is made
for "intervening" unconscionability under section 2-719, which requires no
separate hearing on the issue of unconscionability. The party would argue
that the clause has "fail[ed] of its essential purpose" under section 2719(2).155 A separate hearing by the trial court would not then be

required. 156
The important point is that a mere showing that actual damages exceed
the amount liquidated does not automatically validate the reasonableness of
the liquidated damage provision. Of course, if the aggrieved party makes
such a case and is nevertheless satisfied with the amount liquidated, courts
should enforce the clause. 157 The intent of the parties must provide the primary focus for courts in determining whether a provision is unreasonably
small. If the intent was to liquidate damages, courts should invalidate the
clause as unreasonable under section 2-718. If, on the other hand, regardless
of the language used by the parties, the intent was to limit remedies, courts
should judge the clause under the standards of section 2-719 on limitation or
modification of remedies. This alternative was the approach taken by one
court in a case involving the sale of an experimental aircraft. 158 The contract provided that the seller would incur no liability for failure of or delay
in delivery, but that in such an event the buyer "may cancel this order and
have the full deposit refunded." '15 9 The court determined that the clause was
an attempt to limit remedies rather than to liquidate damages to the amount
of the deposit. 1 6 The court then concluded that the clause both met the
requirements of section 2-719 and was not unconscionable under section 2302.161 The buyer was thus restricted to the refund remedy. Conversely, a
court found in another case that a similar provision was an attempt to liquidate damages. 162 Accordingly, the seller could pursue his other remedies
under the Code if he could prove that the amount liquidated was unreasona163
bly small.
Contracts for burglar alarm service represent recurring examples of situations in which contracts provide for small "liquidated" damages. The con154. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978); see also, Comment, supra note 119, at 1366-67 (1977) for a
discussion of the rights afforded a party for a hearing on the issue of unconscionability.
155. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1978).
156. See Dow Coming Corp. v. Capitol Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 622, 627, 6 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 589 (7th Cir. 1969) (assessing unconscionability of liquidated damage provi-

sion without separate hearing).

157. See Coast Trading Co. v. Parmac, Inc., 21 Wash. App. 896, 587 P.2d 1071, 1080, 25
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1047, 1056 (1978).
158. Dow Coming Corp. v. Capitol Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 622, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.

(Callaghan) 589 (7th Cir. 1969).
159. Id. at 626, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 594.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 626-27, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 595.
162. Palestine Ice, Fuel & Gin Co. v. Walter Connally & Co., 148 S.W. 1109 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1912, writ ref'd); see Manely Auto Co. v. Jackson, 237 P. 982 (Or. 1925);
Verner v. B.L. Lanier Fruit Co., 370 So. 2d 61, 63, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 716, 718
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
163. 370 So. 2d at 63, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 718.
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tract usually states that the burglar alarm service company will incur
liability in the event of breach for damages "liquidated" in some small
amount, say $50. Quite obviously, one does not hire such a service to protect property worth no more than such a small amount. The clause is thus
not a reasonable forecast of either the anticipated or, as the cases develop,
the actual harm. Nevertheless, courts have uniformly upheld the clauses on
the reasoning that, regardless of the language used, the intent was to limit
and not to liquidate damages. 164 Absent a showing of unconscionability,
courts uniformly enforce such clauses. Although these cases do involve service contracts and are thus not governed by the Code, the analysis by the
courts is instructive with respect to determining the validity of clauses that
provide for small liquidated damages.
III.

LITIGATION AND DRAFTING ASPECTS

A. Litigation
The party seeking to enforce a liquidated damage provision has the burden of proving its validity. 165 Under the Code, this burden requires the aggrieved party to prove not only the reasonableness of the provision, but also
its own compliance with the terms of the contract so that it is entitled to
performance from the breaching party. 16 6 The aggrieved party must also
prove that the clause is part of the agreement 67 and that the clause is appli168
cable according to its terms.
An agreement liquidating damages can be shown by custom or usage of
trade. 169 In sales of livestock courts have held that, in the absence of a
showing in the livestock trade of treating a down payment as liquidated
damages or of any other evidence of such an intent by the parties, the mere
fact of a down payment does not warrant a holding that the payment repre70
sents liquidated damages.'
In attacking a liquidated damage clause, the aggrieved party should take
the position that the clause is unreasonable in terms of the specific factors
listed in section 2-718(1). As this Article has demonstrated, however, important questions remain open under section 2-718 as to the point in time
164. See Better Food Mkts. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 179, 253 P.2d 10, 16
(1953); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Kings Indus., Inc., 255 Cal. App. 2d 919, 63 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588
(1967); Vallance & Co. v. De Anda, 595 S.W.2d 587, 589-90 (Tex. Civ. App. San Antonio
1980, no writ).
165. McCarthy v. Tally, 46 Cal. 2d 577, 297 P.2d 981 (1956); Better Food Mkts. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 179, 253 P.2d 10 (1953). See generally 5 CORBIN, supra note 9,
§ 1062 (valid liquidated damage provisions makes proof as to amount of injury unnecessary).
166. See Jones v. Abriani, 169 Ind. App. 556, 350 N.W.2d 635, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1102, 1111 (1976).
167. See Rangen, Inc. v. Valley Trout Farms, Inc., 658 P.2d 955, 963, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 52, 58 (Idaho 1982).
168. See Mann & Parker Lumber Co. v. Wel-Dri, Inc., 579 F.2d 973, 979, 24 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 345, 352 (6th Cir. 1978).
169. U.C.C. § 1-205 (1978).
170. Wendling v. Puls, 610 P. 2d 580, 585, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1362, 1368-69
(Kan. 1980); see also U.C.C. § 2-718(2)(3) (1978) (allowing breaching buyer recovery of any
down payment subject to statutory set-off and proof by seller of actual damages).
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that is relevant to a determination of reasonableness in light of the specified
factors. Accordingly, the aggrieved party should present evidence at trial as
to the facts as they existed both at the time of contracting and at the time of
breach or trial.
The legal effect of a court's finding that a liquidated damage provision is
invalid is clear. The court merely expunges the clause from the contract; the
validity of the remainder of the contract is not impaired. The promisee may
under the Code as if the clause had never been
then recover actual damages
17
a part of the contract.

1

A valid liquidated damage provision functions to do just that, liquidate
damages. The law almost everywhere provides that parties may recover prejudgment interest for nonpayment of a liquidated debt from the date of
breach until judgment. In the words of Professor Corbin: "If damages that
would have been too uncertain in amount have been liquidated at a certain
amount by agreement, interest is recoverable from the date when that
amount was payable."' 172 Parties must remember that many jurisdictions
require the aggrieved party to specially plead a claim for pre-judgment
interest.
B.

Drafting

The courts have often held that the language used by the parties in a liquidated damage provision is unimportant and will not determine the provision's validity.' 73 As a corollary to the general principle that the intent of
the parties to stipulate damages will not prevent the striking of the clause as
a penalty, the courts have commonly found invalid clauses that specifically
stated that damages were "liquidated."' 74 Conversely, the courts have held
provisions for liquidated damages to be valid despite the use of words such
as "forfeit" or "penalty."' 175 Nevertheless, it is probably unwise as a drafting
proposition to so taint the clause. In a close case, such language might make
all the difference.
The courts have upheld liquidated damages provisions both when a specific

sum 1 76

was provided and when a formula was provided to determine

the amount stipulated. 177 A formula should be used when the parties antici171. See Dunbar, supra note 1, at 227.
172. 5 CORBIN, supra note 9, § 1046.
173. Id. § 1058.
174. See supra notes 48-73 and accompanying text; see also Zurich Ins. Co. v. Kings Indus., Inc., 255 Cal. App 2d 919, 63 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588 (1967) (upholding as remedy limitation
provision that provided that damages were "liquidated").

175. See Uncle George Orphans Home, Inc. v. Landrum, 551 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1977).
176. See Dow Coming Corp. v. Capitol Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 622, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 589 (7th Cir. 1969); Pasquale Foods Co. v. L & H Int'l Airmotive, Inc., 51 Ala.
App. 127, 283 So. 2d 438, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 622 (1973).
177. California & Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. Sun Ship, Inc., 794 F.2d 1433, 1 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1211 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 200 (1987); Grumman Flxible
Corp. v. City of Long Beach, 505 F. Supp. 623, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1248

(E.D.N.Y. 1980); Sawyer Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. Linke, 231 N.W.2d 791, 17 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 102 (N.D. 1975); Ray Farmers Union Elevator Co. v. Weyrauch, 238

1110

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41

pate that the breach might cause varying degrees of injury. If the formula
can be tied to the seriousness of the breach, parties can avoid a major pitfall
in drafting liquidated damage provisions. The courts historically have
stricken liquidated damage provisions as penalties in cases in which the
clause was so broadly drafted that a single specified sum applied to numerous types of breaches of potentially varying degrees of importance. The consistent reasoning of the courts has been that such a provision could not be 78a
reasonable approximation of damages likely to be caused by the breach.
The lesson is that parties should always draft a liquidated damages clause
quite narrowly so that the agreed sum relates to a particular, specified
breach or so that the applicable formula takes into account the potential for
variance in the harm caused by the breach.
Parties should never draft a liquidated damage clause so as to allow the
aggrieved party "to eat his cake and have it too." The courts have found
unreasonable clauses that provide for a minimum of stipulated damages with
the option for the aggrieved party to recover additional damages that might
be proved. The reasoning is that such clauses cannot represent a reasonable
179
attempt to estimate damages.
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